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of political leaders, no discussion of what China can
learn from democratic developments in neighboring East
Asian countries or elsewhere, and no calls for multiparty
elections or a more open media to monitor the ruling
party. Yu is not particularly unique in feeling constrained—
those of us working on the question of political change
in China need to pick our battles carefully—but his close
connections with the ruling establishment mean that he
must be particularly cautious.
Having said that, Yu does put forward some proposals
for political reform under the rubric of “incremental
democratization.” In Chapter 3, he describes various aims
of Hu Jintao’s report to the Seventeenth National Con-
gress of the CCP in 2007 and implicitly notes the often
large gap between reality and the ideal. He argues for
improving democracy at the grassroots level and “then
developing democracy at the higher levels,” though he
does not mention anything higher than the township level.
He also emphasizes “intraparty democracy,” meaning dem-
ocratic reforms within the 76 million member CCP. As Yu
puts it, “if grassroots democracy means pushing forward
democracy from the bottom up, intraparty democracy
entails doing so from the inside out” (p. 19). He is a bit
vague about what that would mean in practice: “The cen-
tral focus of improving intraparty democracy lies in the
reform of intraparty election, decisionmaking, and in
revamping oversight systems” (p. 19). However, John
Thornton’s foreword rather optimistically notes that “one
intriguing possibility mentioned by some knowledgeable
Chinese, which would represent an important advance,
would be for the 371-member Central Committee to elect
directly the next Politburo—and perhaps even the Stand-
ing Committee—in 2012, when Hu and his comrades are
expected to retire and transfer power to the next genera-
tion of China’s leaders” (p. x).
At some level, Yu is arguing for more open and account-
able government. But he also favors more government
intervention and regulation of society. For example, he
notes that most civil society organizations are not offi-
cially registered with the government, hence the need for
“a mother law for supervising civic organizations” (p. 69).
His recommendations are motivated partly by the need to
more effectively deal with problems like environmental
protection and poverty alleviation, but the caveat that only
civil society groups “that are small, engage in limited activ-
ities, and do not concern themselves with important polit-
ical issues should be registered” (p. 84) is cause for concern.
In Chapter 12, Yu argues against federalism. This essay
shows him at his intellectual best: The argument is clear,
concise, and thought provoking. He discusses advocates
for federalism in China in the early twentieth century and
argues that they failed because they seriously misunder-
stood how it was practiced in Western countries, they
underestimated the cultural influence of a unitary politi-
cal ideal in China, and they did not grasp the extent to
which their ideas could be misused by local despots and
warlords. But he notes (correctly) that most scholars believe
there is no direct link between democracy and federalism.
Perhaps most disappointing, Yu never really does spell
out the long-term political goal for China. There should
be incremental progress toward what kind of democracy
exactly? In his famous essay “Democracy Is a GoodThing,”
he recognizes that democracy can go wrong, but he blames
“certain politicians who do not understand the objective
rules of democratic government” (p. 4). In its essence,
“democracy guarantees basic human rights, offers equal
opportunity to all people, and represents a basic human
value” (p. 4): In short, it expresses the political values we
ought to care about. Perhaps the book should have been
entitled “A Good Thing is Democracy.” What is clear is
that China’s political future is bound to be democratic,
however we define the term; “political democracy is the
trend of history, and it is the inevitable trend for all nations
to move toward democracy” (p. 4). But he also notes that
China’s “construction of political democracymust be closely
integrated with the history, culture, traditions, and exist-
ing social conditions in our nation” (p. 5). How do we
distinguish between good and bad values in Chinese polit-
ical culture, and how can the good ones shape Chinese-
style democracy? These questions are left unaswerered.
What the book does show is a potentially sharp and
politically astute mind at work. But the best of Yu comes
through only in the more historical chapters, 7 and 12,
when he doesn’t have to worry too much about the polit-
ical consequences of what he says. We probably need to
wait till Yu retires from politics before he shares his more
penetrating thoughts on the present and future state of
Chinese politics.
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For quite a long time, there was little controversy in the
literature about what should be understood by the con-
cept of deliberation: that all citizens affected by a decision
are able to present their arguments in a free and uncon-
strained way; that arguments are justified in an elaborate
and rational manner, and are framed in terms of the com-
mon good; that all arguments are treated with respect;
that actors are truthful in what they say; and that deci-
sions are made in the public eye, and at the end of the
decision process the force of the better argument prevails,
leading to consensus.
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Yet recent years have seen increasing controversy about
the exact definition of deliberation. Can personal stories
also be used to justify an argument? Do self-interests have
a place in deliberation? Are there arguments that are not
acceptable? Is truthfulness always an absolute necessity? Is
it better if some sequences of a decision process take place
behind closed doors? Is it still deliberative if no consensus
is achieved?
The two books under review greatly increase the con-
troversies about what is meant by deliberation. Christian
F. Rostbøll looks at deliberation from the perspective of
critical theory, claiming in a provocative way that some-
times deliberation has the task of disrupting a consensus
based on false consciousness. Equally provocative, Sharon
R. Krause, starting from David Hume with his concept of
moral sentiment, claims that there is more passion in the
deliberative model than is commonly acknowledged.These
provocations are welcome and will lead to an even livelier
debate among deliberative scholars. For scholars like myself,
who look at deliberation mainly from an empirical side, it
becomes increasingly difficult to come up with a single
measurement of the level of deliberation. This is not nec-
essarily a problem; we simply will have different empirical
research agendas, depending on howwe define deliberation.
Empirical studies of what actually happens when poli-
ticians or ordinary citizens come together to discuss polit-
ical issues have demonstrated that deliberation is not a
unidimensional but a multidimensional phenomenon.
Actors who are good at justifying their arguments, for
example, do not always show respect for the arguments of
others. And those who refer consistently to the common
good are themselves not always willing to yield to the
force of the better argument. Empirical studies also have
revealed that deliberation has a dynamic aspect in the sense
that during a decision process, the importance of deliber-
ation may very well vary from sequence to sequence. The
books of Krause and Rostbøll make it even more prob-
lematic to delimit the concept of deliberation. This, of
course, is not speaking against these two important books.
But they make us all the more aware that deliberation
should not be considered a static and unidimensional phe-
nomenon. We can no longer simply ask whether deliber-
ation is a good thing or not, since the answer depends very
much on what we mean by deliberation and where we
locate it. Those who criticize, for example, the model of
Jürgen Habermas cannot raise the same criticism against
the models of Krause and Rostbøll, and vice versa. I con-
sider this development refreshing for the future of debate
on the merits of deliberation.
InDeliberative Freedom, Rostbøll reminds Habermas of
his roots in the Frankfurt School of critical theory with its
focus on freedom as emancipation, and he complains that
Habermas andmost other deliberative theorists now neglect
this dimension of freedom. The main concern of Rostbøll
is that often there is hidden domination in deliberation:
“Much political domination is exercised not by directly
denying the protection of expressed interests of the oppressed
but by manipulating the way in which the latter interpret
their interests. . . . Issues such as self-deception, adaptive
preference formation, manipulation, ideological domina-
tion, and the like may all be contributing factors to the
way in which people understand what is good for them”
(pp. 42, 156; emphasis in original). As examples of such
domination, Rostbøll mentions workers under capitalism,
women in patriarchal societies, and minority cultures. He
sees the danger of deliberation leading to false consensus,
neglecting such domination. For Rostbøll, it is precisely
the task of deliberation to bring to light hidden domina-
tion. The core of deliberation must be “a concern with the
possibility of criticizing ideologies, biases, conventions,
and the like. . . . [I]f agreement is the product of ideolog-
ical domination, then the aim of deliberation is to show
that the agreement is only apparent, or that it is not the
product of free deliberation. . . . [A] common misunder-
standing of deliberative democracy is that it sees any agree-
ment reached on the basis of talk as good. But clearly
language is not only a medium of reaching free agree-
ment; it can also be used as means of domination, exclu-
sion, and social power” (pp. 25, 148, 149). Rostbøll is not
in principle against consensus, but agreement must be
based on personal autonomy, which means “to be contin-
ually open to learning, to revise one’s views in light of new
evidence” (p. 87).
Rostbøll presents the perspective of critical theory on
deliberation in a well-written, systematic, and, above all,
forceful way. His book is a challenge to deliberative schol-
ars to reflect more carefully on the role of consensus in the
deliberative model. The challenge is particularly great for
scholars like myself who do empirical studies on deliber-
ation. We identify the existence of the force of the better
argument if actors change their position and acknowledge
that arguments of other actors have convinced them to do
so. Rostbøll objects to this way of measuring the force of
the better argument, arguing that actors may change their
position against their true interests. But how can we estab-
lish what true interests are? I agree with Rostbøll that this
can be done from the perspective of critical theory, and I
encourage him to develop an empirical research program
to distinguish between true and false interests. In the mean-
time, some of us will continue to base our research on
what actors actually say about their interests, although we
are not blind to where these interests come from.
Sharon R. Krause’s stimulating and carefully developed
book, Civil Passions, challenges mainstream deliberative
scholarship from quite a different side. Starting fromDavid
Hume, Krause asserts that mainstream deliberative research
puts too much emphasis on rationality, and that more
attention should be given to sentiment and passion. She
argues: “Deliberation, as Hume conceives it, is not devoid
of intellect, but it involves more than merely intellect.
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The process of practical reasoning is a holistic one, in
which cognition and affect are deeply entwined” (p. 103).
From this Humean position, Krause criticizes, in particu-
lar, John Rawls andHabermas for being insufficiently aware
that all reasons have an affective element as well: “To have
a conception of the good therefore is to have an affective
attachment to it or a desire to realize it; when we are
rational, we are also desiring”(p. 30). According to Krause,
Rawls and Habermas include much more affect in their
concept of rationality than they are willing to acknowl-
edge. To demonstrate that pure rationality is impossible,
Krause refers to neuroscience and approvingly quotes
Antonio Damasio, whose research suggests that “the cool
strategy advocated by Kant, among others, has far more to
do with the way patients with prefrontal damage go about
deciding than with how normals usually operate” (p. 54).
Krause does not necessarily advocatemorepassion inpol-
itics, since she is well aware that uncontrolled passion may
have devastating consequences. Her point is, rather, that
we should treat passion as part of deliberation so long as it
has amoral dimension: “Expressions of sentiment can con-
tribute in valuable ways to public deliberation even when
they do not take an explicit argumentative form” (p. 118).
She sees a great range of emotional expressions with the
potential of having amoral dimension: “By allowing infor-
mal, symbolic, and testimonial types of deliberative expres-
sions, [thedeliberative-systemapproach] can enrich citizens’
reflectiononpublic issues and thereby improvepublic delib-
eration. Such expressions are also tremendously important
for the cultivation of moral sentiment” (p. 122). Krause,
however, is aware that she runs into the problemof concept
stretching in including too many emotions in the concept
of deliberation: “To be sure, it is important to distinguish
between deliberative and nondeliberative forms of expres-
sion. Not every expression is deliberative, and we risk los-
ing the clarifying power of analysis if we define the category
too broadly” (p. 119). To count as deliberative for Krause,
emotional acts must “represent (a) efforts to change the
minds and hearts of the public, (b) on some matter of law
orpolicy, and (c)with a view to justice” (p. 119).This delim-
itation between deliberative and nondeliberative emo-
tional acts makes sense, but as an empirical scholar I would
be interested in learning more about how she would put
thisdelimitation intooperational terms todoempiricalwork.
Krause summarizes her overall position in the follow-
ing way: “Our minds are changed when our hearts are
engaged. . . . [W]e cannot be the passionless, disengaged
deliberators that we think we ought to be, even when we
succeed in deliberating impartially. If this book advances
our basic understanding of ourselves, our reflective pas-
sions, and our deliberative practices, it will have fulfilled
its ambition. What it suggests is that any policy initiatives
undertaken on behalf of impartial justice should aim not
for the transcendence but for the civilizing of passions in
public life” (pp. 125, 203).
Both Rostbøll and Krause have written excellent books
on theories of deliberation.What is missing in both books
is a linkage to empirical work on deliberation, to what
actually happens when ordinary citizens and also politi-
cians come together to discuss political issues. To what
extent are they guided by civil passions in the sense of
Krause, and do they break up false consensus in the sense
of Rostbøll? As theorists, of course, they are not required
to do this empirical work themselves, although there are
more and more deliberative theorists who launch them-
selves in a fruitful way into empirical investigations. The
important point that I wish to stress is that we need an
interplay between normative theories of deliberation and
corresponding empirical studies. Indeed, the influence
ought to go in both directions, with empirical research
testing hypotheses formulated by theorists and theorists
benefiting in their work from empirical investigations.
(Such interplay is postulated in a symposium entitled
“Toward More Realistic Models of Deliberative Democ-
racy” in Journal of Political Philosophy 18 [March 2010]:
32–122.) As scholars of deliberation move this research
agenda forward, they can be grateful to Krause and Røst-
boll for bringing to the fore just how multidimensional
deliberative democracy really is.
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The minjung or “common people” movement was a left-
wing group of intellectuals and students in South Korea
in the 1970s and 1980s that was a prominent part of the
ferment that led to the country’s transition to democracy
in 1988. In this work, Namhee Lee presents a detailed
biography of the movement, both its origins and evolu-
tion. Her emphasis is on the movement’s role in shaping
political culture, political ideas, and political discourse in
a way that undermined the legitimacy of the various mil-
itary and civilian authoritarian rulers in South Korea from
1971 to 1988.
Part I deals with the rethinking and rewriting of mod-
ern Korean history by the minjung intellectuals, centered
on the idea of the “oppressed masses” or minjung. In Part II
Lee shows howminjung intellectuals sought to change the
terms of political debate on issues like worker rights and
press freedoms. In Part III, she considers the issue of intel-
lectuals representing “the people” and the contradictions
that arose in this pursuit—not least with the workers
themselves.
This book will be widely valued as the single best
description of the minjung movement. It captures its
essentially ideational nature—this movement was a strug-
gle about “what to think” as much as “what to do.” The
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